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Colonial Constitutionalism and 
Constitutional Law 
MARY SARAH BILDER 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE SHIFT FROM A 
colonial constitutional culture to an explicit written constitution-is apparent yet 
elusive. Thirty years ago, Morton Horwitz's pathbreaking The Transformation of 
American Law, 1780-1860 insisted on a transformation in "private law (tort, con-
tract, property, commercial law)" from the colonial period.1 Horwitz's focus on 
private law diminished interest in the development of early American constitu-
tionalism. As Stanley Katz wrote in 1984, "Constitutional history is certainly not 
dead, but it is not flourishing and its significance for colonial history is not alto-
gether obvious."' Twenty years later, constitutional history and, in particular, co-
lonial constitutional history have once again begun to flourish. Interest in colo-
nial constitutionalism appears in recent work by Lauren Benton, Alexander 
Haskell, Daniel Hulsebosch, Alison LaCroix, David Konig, Bernadette Meyler, Bill 
Offut, Ellen Pearson, Carla Pestana, Claire Priest, Richard Ross, George Van Cleve, 
Craig Yirush, and myself, among others.' Yet there remain significant questions 
about the transformation of colonial constitutionalism to American Constitu-
tional law. This essay argues that this larger transformation was less the result of 
the admittedly important invention of a written constitution than of three less 
apparent transformations. 
Constitutionalism is rampant with transformations: the well-discussed shift 
from the "little c" to "big C" constitution,' the creation of Constitutional law as 
"a new substantive legal genre,"5 and the invention of judicial review.' Since Sir 
My thanks to Alfred Brophy, Paul Halliday, Bernie Meyler, Catherine Patterson, Sharon 
O'Connor, and participants at the American Society for Legal History (2006) and at the 
Cornell Law School's Law and Humanities Colloquium (2007) for comments; to David 
Warrington and Whitney Bagnall for manuscript assistance; to Natasha Hsieh and Andrew 
Golden for assistance in checking footnotes; and to Morton Horwitz and Dan Hulsebosch, 
with whom I first read Joseph Smith. 
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Henry Maine penned his famous transformation of law-from status to contract-
legal historians have been enamored of transformations.' For Maine, as for the 
legally trained who followed him, transformations that can be summed up in a 
phrase-a holding-have been particularly appealing. Daniel Hulsebosch offers a 
fine example of such a succinct transformation in his argument of a shift from a 
preconstitutional focus on jurisdiction to a constitutional focus on jurispru-
dence.' 
American constitutionalism has been enamored of one particular transforma-
tion: the shift from the organic, unwritten British constitution to the defined and 
enumerated written American Constitution. This appealing orthographical shift, 
however, is our own creation. The word "constitution"-in the small c sense-
often appeared in the pre-1776 period with a capital C. Bolingbroke's oft-quoted 
description appeared as: "By Constitution We mean ... that Assemblage of Laws, 
Institutions, and Customs, derived from certain fix'd Principles of Reason ... that 
compose the general System, according to which the Community hath agreed 
to be governed."' Conversely, writers continued to refer to the written federal 
Constitution with a small c into the early nineteenth century.10 Indeed, The Feder-
alist Papers originally appeared with "constitution" consistently spelled with a 
small c." In modernizing the spelling of "Constitution," reprints of constitu-
tional-era texts actually alter our understandings of those texts.12 
Another seemingly apparent transformation is the rise of Constitutional law, 
what Hulsebosch has perceptively referred to as the "shift from common-law con-
stitutionalism" to the "genre of constitutional law."13 Hulsebosch points to Chief 
Justice John Jay's 1794 reference in Chisholm v. Georgia to the "free course of 
.Constitutional law and Government" as a statement that "readers" would under-
stand.14 But precisely when and what did readers understand? In late eighteenth-
and early nineteenth-century constitutional works, Constitutional law (where the 
phrase is a proper noun) can be hard to distinguish from constitutional law 
(where "constitutional" is an adjective describing a type of law).15 The phrase 
curiously does not seem to appear again in the printed Supreme Court reports 
until the arguments of counsel in Ogden v. Saunders in 1827.16 By the 1840s, 
publication of St. George Tucker's lectures marks more widespread use of the 
phrase." Yet only in 1862 does Joel Parker adopt the single title Constitutional 
Law for a pamphlet." Only after the Civil War do treatises entitled simply "Consti-
tutional Law" begin to appear.19 The recognition of a distinct body of law arising 
from the Constitution and conforming to certain interpretive traditions appears 
to postdate by some years the Constitution itself. 
This difficulty in identifying the transformation occurs with constitutional-
ism. Used by late nineteenth-century political scientists, constitutionalism be-
came influential when Andrew McLaughlin and Charles Mcilwain concluded that 
it lay at the heart of liberal democracy.20 In 1932, McLaughlin's The Foundations 
of American Constitutionalism traced "certain essential principles" of limited 
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government-covenants, representation, social compact, judicial review, and fed-
eralism-in the pre-Revolutionary period.21 In 1940, Mcllwain's Constitutional-
ism: Ancient and Modem looked back further and declared that "in all its succes-
sive phases, constitutionalism has one essential quality: it is a legal limitation on 
government."22 In England, the "essential principles ... were no less constitu-
tional" because they were "unwritten."23 Others sought greater precision respect-
ing the type of limitation. Robert Schuyler suggested that the word "unconstitu-
tional" underwent a shift from meaning "the act in question was contrary to 
established usage and convention" to signifying that "it was illegal or void."24 
Walton H. Hamilton's definition emphasized written-ness: "'Constitutionalism' is 
the name given to the trust which men repose in the power of words engrossed 
on parchment to keep a government in order."25 Constitutionalism itself thus 
fluctuates between a narrative of continuity in legal limitations on government 
and a narrative of discontinuity in the specific written form of limitations. 
How do we talk about the continuities and discontinuities created as the 
world in which British constitutionalism involved legal limitations not written in 
one document gave way to an American constitutionalism in which a single writ-
ten document was the limitation? The sense of an abrupt transformation in the 
1780s is reinforced because no word describes the constitutional state of affairs 
before the Revolution. Reserving constitutionalism for the period of written con-
stitutions overemphasizes the post-1776 or perhaps even post-1787 American 
construction of constitutionalism. Focusing on common law, the ancient consti-
tution, and the British constitution overemphasizes the English (as opposed to 
colonial) construction of constitutionalism.26 
Considering the transformation of colonial constitutional law to postcolonial 
constitutional law solves these problems. Harold Hazeltine, John Reid, and Jona-
than Bush have described the relationship between American colonial law and 
England and Great Britain as a constitutional law.27 As Eliga Gould and other 
Atlantic historians have demonstrated, situating American colonial constitution-
alism within the context of the empire allows for a periodization in which the 
Revolution and the Constitution mark neither beginning nor ending points.28 The 
term "colonial constitutional law" traditionally describes the law that governed 
other colonies within the British Empire." The legal opinions of Crown law offi-
cers on colonial questions were called Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law; 
American colonial opinions were included in an earlier collection of similar mate-
rials.30 The term is not wholly anachronistic. Eighteenth-century contemporaries 
perceived a distinct constitution of the colonies. Thomas Pownall referred to the 
"constitution of the colonies" and their "constitutional dependence" on Britain.31 
James Abercromby discussed the "different Constitutions of the Colonies."32 Pre-
Revolutionary Pennsylvanians characterized people as "Friends to our present 
Constitution."33 Stephen Hopkins referred to Rhode Island judges as "under a 
peculiar constitution."34 We might thus consider colonial constitutional law. 
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This essay reconsiders the transformation to Constitutions, Constitutional-
ism, and Constitutional law. In arguing for a "historicist interpretation of con-
stitutional law," H. Jefferson Powell writes, "Constitutional law is thoroughly 
historical, dependent throughout on the contingencies of time and political cir-
cumstances, and ... a coherent tradition of argument."35 As a coherent tradition, 
the transformation of constitutional law does not map neatly onto the 1776-90 
period. A first essential transformation in constitutionalism occurred long before 
1776 when seventeenth-century colonists created a new conception of the written 
and published charter as the location of authority and liberties. A second essential 
transformation occurred only after 1790 when appeals in judicial cases began to 
be publicly reported in print, thereby creating a stable and analyzable body of 
law. A third essential transformation occurred in 1787-but with implications not 
immediately appreciated. Privy Council review of colonial legislation ended and 
no similar review took its place, thus leaving the judiciary the sole arbiter of 
constitutional law. These three transformations created modern American consti-
tutionalism-a law two centuries in the making. 
PATENTS TO CHARTERS 
The shift from charter to constitution is central to American constitutional 
scholarship. The early reliance on charters is often cited as creating a culture that 
would favor written constitutions, either because of the written nature of the 
charter's liberties or because of the habit of defending charters against the 
Crown.36 As recent scholarship demonstrates, however, English boroughs had a 
long, robust history of dealing with and defending charters and chartered liber-
ties.37 Nevertheless, English law does not produce a culture favoring written con-
stitutions-indeed, arguably the contrary. In part, a written constitution may be 
the product of the necessity of declaring independence. If the English boroughs 
had attempted to declare independence, perhaps they too would have founded 
their authority solely on a written document. The American colonists nonetheless 
were extremely taken with written documents as sources of and limitations on 
government. 
Admittedly, prior to 1776, colonists dealt with charters; after 1776, they wrote 
constitutions. Yet this verbal transformation may not signify the immediate trans-
formation that we assume. Within the larger British Empire, this same semantic 
shift occurred over two centuries. Charters governed the early seventeenth-cen-
tury Canadian settlements for Nova Scotia (1621),38 Avalon (Newfoundland) 
(1623), and Ruperts Bay (the Hudson's Bay Company) (1670).39 Charters remained 
relevant even as Americans turned toward constitutions. New South Wales's Char-
ter of Justice (1787) .established court jurisdictions prior to settlement gover-
nance.40 The East India Company continued to govern India pursuant to a charter 
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into the nineteenth,century.41 By the mid-nineteenth century, however, the em-
pire began to shift toward constitutions. Unlike American documents, these took 
the form of either a letters patent'' or a parliamentary act such as the British 
North America Act (1867), often referred to as the Constitution Act, and the Com-
monwealth of Australia Constitution Act (1900).43 The latter was a British statute 
passed by Parliament after colonial convention, ratified, and approved by Parlia-
ment with amendments."' Rhetorically the empire moved from charter to consti-
tution-but substantively, the shift in authority was more transitional and subtle. 
The word "constitution" continues to carry a different meaning than it does for 
Americans." 
The shift from charters to constitutions on the American side may also be 
misleading. A more crucial shift occurred a century earlier when the colonists 
developed a conception of the charter as opposed to a patent. Colonists did not 
initially refer to what we think of as a charter as a charter; rather they called it a 
patent, short for "letters patent." The leading scholar on the Connecticut charter, 
Albert Bates, concluded that the words "charter" and "patent" were used inter-
changeably."46 This conclusion seems true with respect to English charters. Those 
in corporate towns referred to their incorporating letters patent as letters patent 
and charters." Among trading companies, a similar use of the word "charter" 
seems to have been common. The published charter of the Worshipful Company 
of Shipwrights (c. 1612) included numerous self-references to charter." Histori-
ans have made their own distinctions. Historians have conventionally used "pa-
tent" to refer to a document with less authority (for example, the Peirce Patent 
or the Plymouth Patent) and reserved "charter" for the document that appears 
to be the genealogical ancestor of a state constitution. But this distinction is 
modern. 
What was the historic difference between a patent and a charter? Throughout 
the medieval period, although both were issued under the Great Seal, charters 
were grants in perpetuity, in Latin, attested to by witnesses, addressed to a particu-
lar group of officials and nobility, and recorded in the Charter Rolls. "Letters 
patent" referred to a more general type of document, so called because they were 
literally open letters as opposed to letters close and were addressed "to all whom 
these presents come." After 1516, grants creating rights in perpetuity under 
seal-charters-were created by letters patent and copied into the patent rolls.49 
Yet "patent" retained a separate meaning as a more temporary grant of privileges, 
a point reinforced by the debate over monopolies and the Statute of Monopolies 
(1623).50 Some commentators suggest that the charter/patent distinction contin-
ued in the color of the wax seal used: green for charters, yellow (or red) for tempo-
rary patents.51, 
Neither charters nor patents were designed as physical documents to facilitate 
precise public knowledge. The documents were written on multiple sheepskin 
parchments, with a depiction of the king, an ornate border, and rows of tiny writ-
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ing not organized in paragraphs. "Publishing" the charter in the sense of enabling 
the community to learn of its provisions had been a problem since the thirteenth 
century, when in theory Henry III had ordered the Great Charter of John read 
aloud.52 Relatively few English patents or charters were published in print before 
the seventeenth century. 
Colonists in the early decades of the seventeenth century used the word "pa-
tenf' over "charter." In Virginia, "patent" appears where we would expect the 
word "charter."53 The Orders and Constitutions (1619-20) listed books to be held 
by the secretary. The first book was to include copies of the "Kings Letters Patents 
to the Companie"; the third book was to include "Patents, Charters, and Inden-
tures" granted by the company.54 While the company itself gave a "greate Charter 
or commission of privileges, orders, and laws" delegating its authority to the local 
political corporation in 1618, it continually referred to the document from the 
Crown as a "patent."55 The distinction is particularly noticeable in the 1620s when 
the Crown attempted to call in the Virginia charter. The Crown described the 
document as a charter; the settlers responded by talking about the letters patent.56 
Moreover, the Virginia Company made no effort to publish these documents in 
print.s1 
A similar preference for the word "patent" appears in Massachusetts Bay. One 
of the few references to a charter appears in the Form of Government adopted by 
the company in April 1629. The company declared that "his Majesty's said char-
ter" had given "power and authority" sufficient to "settle and establish an abso-
lute government."58 Yet the famous vote transferring the government of the com-
pany to Massachusetts Bay referred only to the '<Patent."59 John Winthrop later 
wrote with respect to the clause: "For it being the manner for such as procured 
Patents for Virginia, Bermudas and the Weste Indies, to keep the chiefe Govern-
ment in the hands of the Company residinge in England ... this clause is inserted 
in this and all other Patents."60 Throughout the 1630s, the word "patent" repeat-
edly appeared. In New Eng/ands Prospect in 1634, William Wood discussed "our 
Patent for the Massachusetts Bay."61 In 1641, Emmanuel Downing wrote to Hugh 
Peter about the quo warranto action, noting it had been brought '.'against our 
Patentees, thinking to damme our patent."62 As in Virginia, no publication of the 
charter or patent appeared. John Cotton's An Abstract; or, The Lawes of New En-
gland in 1641, Nathaniel Ward's manuscript version of the Body of Liberties in 
1641, and the Laws and Liberties of 1648 did not contain references to a charter. 
Perhaps governing authorities operating outside the authority conveyed had little 
to gain from publication." Charter as both word and substantive document lacked 
positive political resonance-the colonists had patents. 
Public declarations of the political connotation of the word "charter" as an 
important document providing au.thority occur with the Maryland proprietary. 
Unlike the Massachusetts Bay and Virginia "charters," the 1632 letters patent 
given to Lord Baltimore was in Latin, although without the elaborate greetings of 
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the medieval charters. It described itself as "hanc presentem Chartam nos-
trum"-"this our present Charter."" (Note the unusual ch spelling of the Latin 
word for charter.) Contemporaries referred to it as a charter. In 1635, A Relation 
of Maryland included the "Charter to the Lord Baltemore, translated into En-
glish."65 Although a few English trading company charters had been printed, the 
Maryland charter appears to have been the first printed colonial charter.66 In 1637, 
Lord Baltimore referred to the document as a charter.67 A proprietor given expan-
sive powers under the charter may have gained from a publicly available docu-
ment. 
With the English Revolution, the political meanings of "charter" and "pa-
tent" begin to separate. On one hand, in Massachusetts, John Winthrop clings to 
patent. In his "Discourse on Arbitrary Government" of 1644, he focused on the 
legal authority conveyed by the "foundation" of the government under the "pa-
tent."68 Winthrop closely read the clauses to establish a "Regulated" govern-
ment. 69 The Committee of Deputies in response argued that they found no "suche 
distinction in the Patent."70 Yet elsewhere that same year, the word "charter" 
seems to be growing in appeal. Parliament gave Rhode Island a "free Charter of 
Civil Incorporation and Government." (Historians interestingly call it a patent.) 
By 1649, Plymouth leader Edward Winslow called the Plymouth patent "their 
Charter."71 In 1654, a Barbados "charter" was published. The growing appeal of 
the word "charter" to convey authority was evident in the fact that the document 
was not a charter but Articles of Agreement (1651) between Crown commissioners 
and Lord Willoughby of Parnham.72 Conversely, by the 1650s, a pamphlet attack-
ing Baltimore's grant refused to call it a charter, referring throughout to "the 
illegality of his patent."73 
The return of royal power did not dampen the growing preference for char-
ters. Like the letters patent for Massachusetts and the one for Virginia, the 1662 
and 1663 Connecticut and Rhode Island documents did not call themselves char-
ters. Indeed, in England, John Winthrop described the Connecticut document as 
a patent while conducting negotiations.74 Yet colonists had no doubt they had 
gained charters. In 1662, the General Assembly read the "Patent or Charter" and 
thereafter referred to it continually as a charter.75 Rhode Island law provided for 
the transfer at the governor's death of "the Charter, with his Majesty's letters, and 
such other papers as concern the colony."76 By 1665, Massachusetts Bay residents 
similarly began to refer to the 1629 document as a charter.77 The 1663 charter for 
Carolina and the 1681 charter to William Penn followed earlier proprietary char-
ters explicitly describing themselves as charters. Indeed, the charter to William 
Penn for Pennsylvania apparently has a green seal, as sometimes has been sug-
gested to signify charter.78 This transformation from patent to charter may explain 
why the letters patent from the Crown to Virginia in 1676, which declared itself 
to be a letters patent, is rarely referred to as a charter, despite John Burk's titling 
the document such in his publication.79 
Colonial Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law 35 
By choosing "charter" over "patent," the mid-seventeenth-century colonists 
absorbed into their documents the connotation of an ancient grant of liberties, 
customs, and self-governance. Catherine Patterson notes that in English bor-
oughs, the charter had "an almost sacred quality in the minds of most citizens."80 
Sacredness was hard to establish in a recently granted document, never mind one 
often replaced and possibly revoked. Indeed, the changing orthography of "Magna 
Carta" reinforced this association between a charter and ancient liberties and 
authority.81 By the mid-seventeenth century, the majority of political treatises 
preferred the ch spelling-"Magna Charta"-with its visual insistence on charter. 
Henry Care's English Liberties; or, The Free-Born Subjects Inheritance of 1682 is 
the most notable of these works.82 By 1689, Gershom Bulkeley referred to "ancient 
Charter-privileges" of the decidedly un-ancient Connecticut charter.83 
Ironically, by the 1680s, charters had become vulnerable to writs of quo war-
ranto, legal proceedings to revoke a charter. The Crown, for the "first time in 
centuries, fought quo warrantos all the way to final judgment."" Most shocking 
for colonists was the revocation of London's perceived ancient charter in 1681-83. 
In England, after 1680, the controversy produced multiple print publications of 
London's charter and books on the quo warranto proceedings-many of which 
traveled across the Atlantic to interested observers. The title pages of these charter 
publications emphasized the importance of their appearance in print "verbatim" 
with explanations for the public.85 
Although these publications had not prevented loss of .London's charter, colo-
nists perceived the publication as a method for declaration of lawful and local 
authority. Colonial charters soon began to appear in print, Carolina in 1682 and 
1684, and Pennsylvania in 1687. In 1689, Samuel Green even produced a posthu-
mous printing of the 1629 Massachusetts charter, which was legally revoked in 
1684. The publication attempted to create and legitimize local authority after the 
loss of the charter and the ascension of William of Orange.86 
In these new printed charters, colonial authority was literally written large. 
The 1691 Massachusetts charter appeared in print in 1692. On the title page, 
CHARTER and NEW-ENGLAND loomed in substantial typeface, dwarfing the far smaller 
acknowledgement "Granted by their Majesties King William and Queen Mary."87 
By the eighteenth century, colonial statute collections that began with the charter 
visually insisted that legal authority arose from the charter." Printing the charters 
distanced them from Crown prerogative and converted them to matters of right. 
Thus in 1721, Jeremiah Dummer wrote A Defence of the New-England Charters 
to explain the "Rjght which the Charter Governments have to those Privileges."" 
This perception that the charters represented independent colonial authority 
rather than royal grants grew even greater by the 1760s. In 1764, John Dickinson 
thus wrote of Pennsylvania's colonial c.onstitution, "Let any impartial person re-
flect how contradictory some of these privileges are to the most ancient principles 
of the English constitution, and how directly opposite other of them are to the 
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settled prerogatives of the crown."90 The printed charters had become the property 
of the colonists, not the Crown. 
Charters thus embodied colonial constitutions. The 1765 Laws of Maryland 
aimed to include matters "relative to the Constitution" of the province, central of 
which was the charter, demarcated on the title page in large letters.91 In 1774 
and 1775, the Continental Congress framed its responses to British actions in 
Massachusetts as violations and subversions of the charter." The South Carolina 
constitution of March 1776 condemned material alterations in the "chartered 
constitution of government." By 1776, Thomas Paine explained that "the articles 
or charter of government" should precede the choice of men to execute the gov-
ernment." He proposed a "coNTINENTALCHARTER, or Charter of the United Colonies; 
(answering to what is called the Magna Charta of England)" for the new nation." 
The Declaration of Independence echoed this repositioning of the charter as a 
colonial right. It condemned the king for "taking away our c.harters."95 
The new Americans would write documents that they would come to refer 
to as constitutions because they literally constituted new forms of government. 
Gradually "constitution" became the name of such documents." Indeed, James 
Madison initially described the Articles of Confederation as a "federal Constitu-
tion" in his 1787 notes of the Constitutional Convention.97 These written docu-
ments were based on the colonial conception of a charter, in which public author-
ity, not Crown authority, was declared and defined. Thus Rhode Island and 
Connecticut initially were completely comfortable with retaining colonial char-
ters once the references to the Crown had been struck.98 As late as 1819, James 
Madison could write, "It could not but happen, and was foreseen at the birth of 
the Constitution, that difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally 
arise in expounding terms and phrases necessarily used in such a charter."" The 
Constitution was a type of charter-a particular type that the colonists had been 
attempting to claim for years. 
Rather than a dramatic step from charter to Constitution that bifurcates the 
colonial period from the constitutional one, the adoption of the term "constitu-
tion" was perhaps initially a less dramatic step.100 The technical replacement of 
the people for the Crown as the ultimate source of governmental authority was 
significant but did not mean that constitutional understandings based on practice 
under the colonial charters vanished. The modes of legal practice in the chartered 
world continued t<i prove relevant for legal practice in a Constitutional world. 
Relocating this transformation in the late seventeenth century in the growing 
belief in a publicly available printed charter as the source and limit of governmen-
tal authority would suggest a constitutional tradition that crosses over the found-
ing period rather than commencing in it. 
PRINTED CASES TO THE PRINTED REPORTS 
If the transformation from patent to charter suggests that the American con-
stitutional tradition stretches back with historical and legal continl)ity to the late 
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seventeenth century, a transformation involving colonial appeals to the Privy 
Council stretches this tradition into the nineteenth century. Because the deci-
sions in these appeals were not reported in print, they have not been seen as 
creating a body of colonial constitutional law. 
Yet Americans after the Revolution did not uniformly embrace printed and 
published reports. No cases from the Supreme Court appeared in a reported vol-
ume until 1798, an official court reporter was not appointed until 1817, and only 
in 1834 did the Court conclude that the copyright in the opinions rested with the 
public. 101 Although unreported in print, the decisions in Privy Council appeals 
were known to elite colonial and English lawyers. If a body of colonial constitu-
tional law existed, then law in the early national period likely related to it either 
by continuing or rejecting substantive boundaries and interpretive conventions. 
For Americans, appeals to 'the Privy Council are part of an obscure and less 
well-understood historical jurisdiction. In much of the former British Empire, 
however, appeals to the Privy Council, oi more accurately, the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council, remain a significant and contested aspect of British constitu-
tionalism. The Judicial Committee, created in its present form in 1833, continues 
to operate as "the court of final appeal for the UK overseas territories and Crown 
dependencies, and for those Commonwealth countries that have retained the ap-
peal to Her Majesty in Council or, in the case ofRepublics, to the Judicial Commit-
tee."102 Until 1949 Canada fell within this jurisdiction; until 1986, Australia; and 
until 2004, New Zealand. 103 Over twenty-five various territories, states, republics, 
and islands remain under the controversial jurisdiction. The membership of the 
committee is comprised of the former and present "Lord Chancellors, certain Privy 
Counselors with judicial experience, various overseas members (senior judges and 
former judges from countries where there is a right of appeal), and Lords of Ap-
peal. In 2007, ninety-three overseas appeals were entered. 104 The committee re-
mains important in areas such as the death penalty. 105 In 2004, the committee 
concluded that Jamaica's mandatory death penalty in cases of murder was "inhu-
man."106 But it has been commercial litigants who have been one of the major 
forces in favor of retention, approving of the committee's perceived expertise and 
uniformity.107 
Until the mid-nineteenth century, Privy Council judgments were not re-
ported.108 At Macquarie University, Bruce Kercher has published unreported Privy 
Council appeals on the Web. 109 He explains that "we were taught at law school in 
the early 70s that Australian law nearly always followed that of England. Now a 
number of us have found that to be quite wrong."110 A similar problem occurred 
with respect to the colonial American appeals. George Chalmers pointed out that 
Blackstone's Commentaries "were barren on such legal topics, as relate to our 
colonies." Blackstone was unable to "obtain materials," as appeals from the colo-
nies "lay to the king in his council" rather than in his bench. If appeals had been 
to the bench, "there would there have been many reports laid before the public" 
and Blackstone could have drawn on these reports. However, there "have been 
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scarcely any reports of cases, which were decided, on such appeals, and were ac-
cessible to research."111 
The perception that constitutional law must begin with the Supreme Court 
is the product of this fact that colonial constitutional law prior to the Revolution 
did not appear in print. In fact, what understanding we have of the appeals has 
been the product of print publication. One appeal in 1728, Winthrop u. Lechmere, 
has received the most attention because of the mid-nineteenth-century publica-
tion of the Connecticut governor's papers with extensive discussion of the appeal. 
In Winthrop, the Privy Council addressed whether Connecticut's intestacy law 
requiring partible inheritance (real property to be divided among children) was 
permissible. The Privy Council declared the statute "null and void." The appeal 
has often been seen as a precedent for judicial review. As a result, however, the 
appeal is idiosyncratic. Two later appeals from Massachusetts and Connecticut 
both upheld partible inheritance. Similarly, an English solicitor who handled an 
extensive number of the colonial appeals noted that the "null and void" language 
"was never done in any one Case, before or since, to my Knowledge.''112 It was due 
in part to the defendant's apparently terrible defense and to the fact that Connecti-
cut laws were not subject to prior review. In other colonies, with the exception of 
Rhode Island, appeals involved laws that had been previously reviewed by the 
council.113 
The colonial appeals to the Privy Council demarcate a body of colonial consti-
tutional law. Extant appeals briefs-often referred to as Printed Cases-can help 
describe the boundaries and interpretive traditions of colonial constitutional law. 
Four large collections contain briefs collected by English barristers and judges, 
in particular, George Lee and Charles Yorke, who argued before the committee 
and later served on the committee.114 The Columbia collection is believed to be 
that of William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut, who traveled to England between 
1767 and 1771 and collected Printed Cases in a variety of English appeals. Briefs 
also survive for the New England intestate cases Phillips u. Sauage and Winthrop u. 
Lechmere. Additional briefs likely survive, particularly in the papers of the English 
solicitors, barristers, and judges and among family papers of those involved in the 
appeals. 
Colonial appeals were repeatedly structured by the constitutional require-
ment in charters and instructions that colonial law not be repugnant to the laws 
of England.115 The centrality of this requirement is made clear in a brief in the 
Massachusetts Phillips appeal in 1734. Phillips raised the same intestate issue as 
had been raised in Winthrop. After Winthrop, Rhode Island had repealed its parti-
ble intestate law, Connecticut had stopped deciding intestate cases while attempt-
ing to figure out how to reverse the appeal, and Massachusetts worried about its 
own statute. 116 The appeal argued that partible inheritance was repugnant to the 
laws of England. The colonial assembly had the power under the charter only to 
make laws "as are not repugnant or contrary to the Laws of England," and the 
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laws subverted "the established Rules and Principles of Law" relating to descents 
of real estates. To emphasize the importance of repugnancy as the constitutional 
standard, the lawyer underlined on the brief the quoted charter sentence relating 
to repugnancy.117 
With repugnancy as a constitutional standard, decisions with respect to one 
colony might have bearing on another colony. In the same brief in the Phillips 
appeal, the second argument was that "the Point in Question hath already re-
ceived a Determination by his Majesty's Order in Council on the Appeal in Win-
throp, which is conceived to be a Case in Point."118 To the English counsel arguing 
the case, other appeals-in this instance Winthrop-held some relevant value. 
Moreover, after the committee decided Phillips in favor of the colony's intestate 
act under. the theory that partible inheritance was an ancient colony custom, a 
second appeal was brought from Connecticut, and a similar result followed."' The 
Connecticut agent made reference to the "Precedent" of the Winthrop case in 
noting that it was likely to be alterable.120 
Colonial legal observers perceived a body of colonial constitutional law. While 
in England, Johnson attended hearings of the Privy Council Committee, the 
House of Lords, and other courts. His handwritten notes, with one or two excep-
tions, are only on the briefs from the colonies.121 Some comments related to the 
appeal practice. In Freebody v. Brenton, Johnson made a note that it was better 
to introduce colonial acts in writing under seal, as the judges had refused in one 
appeal to hear read to them "several Laws of Rho[d]e Island out of the Printed 
Colony Law Book."122 Almost always, Johnson included the outcome: "reversed" 
or "affirmed." Sometimes, Johnson wrote more extensive comments explaining 
the reasons for the decision. Two examples involving Caribbean appeals indicate 
that colonial constitutionalism appears to have been characterized by a flexible 
or at least contextual interpretation of repugnancy and that the boundaries of 
substantive law were not our familiar private/public law divide. 
The contextual nature of repugnancy appears in an appeal from Grenada. The 
issue was whether a Roman Catholic mother would lose guardianship of her child 
after the father's death (a possibility under English law). Grenada had been re-
cently brought within the empire after the Treaty of Paris of 1763. The Privy 
Council Committee reversed the lower judgment barring her guardianship. The 
mother and her new husband won. In analyzing the appeal, Joseph Smith applied 
a rigid theoretical theory of the extension of English law to the plantations and 
concluded that the "Committee demonstrated little understanding of the question 
posed" and that the reversal was on "untenable and patently nonlegalistic 
grounds."123 Rather than betraying that the committee misunderstood applicable 
law, the comment reveals the degree to which the appeals were decided under a 
constitutional jurisprudence that differed from common law. The brief had argued 
that the laws in England against Catholics should not be executed with rigor in 
"the new ceded governments" where "they were allowed the free Exercise of their 
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Religion ... so far as is not repugnant to the Laws of Great Britain."124 Johnson's 
interest in the appeal likely stemmed from the question of whether colonial laws 
and practices in favor of Roman Catholics were repugnant to the laws of England. 
Johnson interpreted the appeal to support non-repugnancy. He concluded, "The 
Laws agst Roman Catholicks are not executed with that rigour in England that 
the Mother should be deprived of the Guardianship of her Child, much less should 
they be so in the ceded Islands where it would be contrary to Justice and to all 
sound Policy. Even a Jewiss has been permitted to be Guardian in England, a 
fortiori a Roman Catholic."125 "Justice" and "sound Policy" mattered. Free exer-
cise of religion for Roman Catholics appeared not repugnant in the colonies. 
What Smith bemoaned as the "patently nonlegalistic" decision in appeals may 
have significance for understanding the way in which early constitutional cases 
were argued and decided. While colonial appeals often raised questions of techni-
cal interpretation and careful construction, they also provided a forum in which 
claims about the colonies' place in the empire and the relationship of law to 
society was openly invited. From the colonial perspective, colonial constitutional 
law was a body of law in which law, policy, and justice intertwined. Bruce Kercher 
in a recent article on judicial interpretation of repugnancy in Australia points out 
that "colonial judges were in a very different position from their counterparts in 
England, on whom they were supposed to model themselves." He concludes that 
Australian judges "did not take these repugnancy provisions to mean just a con-
flict of one particular rule with another, but took a much broader, constitutional 
approach."1" Did early Supreme Court justices model their interpretation on the 
English common-law bench or on the Privy Council that had overseen the validity 
of colonial law? 
Free exercise of religion is a familiar area of modern constitutional law. How-
ever, a Virginia appeal in 1766, Corbin v. Lomax, reflects the differing dimensions 
of colonial constitutionalism. Nothing about the appeal seems constitutional to 
our notion of constitutional jurisprudence. Among other issues, it involved 
whether an Elizabethan statute, the Statute against Fraudulent Conveyances 
(1585), applied in Virginia. As a technical matter, the case involved the validity of 
a fee tail in a situation involving a conveyance after marriage without monetary 
consideration. The committee affirmed the colony's judgment.127 Johnson ex-
plained succinctly, "Stat. of 27 Eliz. doth not extend to Plantations."128 Although 
the appeal had only involved Virginia, Johnson drew a conclusion about the stat-
ute applicable to all the American colonies. 
The appeal indicates the significant transformation in the substance to this 
constitutional law after the Constitution. During the colonial period, what we 
would think of as common-law and private law issues arose in this constitutional 
framework. In other appeals, the Privy Council ultimately decided whether colo-
nial constitutional law required two witnesses or three to a will or whether colo-
nies had to follow primogeniture. With the Constitution, these issues fell out of 
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the national constitutional framework. What had been a colonial constitutional 
issue-whether a colony had to follow the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances, the 
Statute of Frauds, other English statutes, and common law-became by default a 
matter of state common law. Neither the Constitution nor federal law attempted 
to occupy much of the substantive legal space previously occupied by the "laws of 
England." In property, contract, and commercial law and bankruptcy, "English" 
and "American" rules came into existence as states followed colonial decisions or 
reached new conclusions. The Constitution's inclusion of criminal jury trials, ha-
beas corpus, and bills of attainder would transfer colonial constitutionalism in 
these areas, and national criminal common-law jurisdiction remained a subject 
of much contest.129 Yet for most "private" law matters, nineteenth-century Ameri-
can law thus de-constitutionalized colonial constitutional law.130 
The late eighteenth-century Supreme Court did not quickly replace these 
traditional constitutional cases with a new substantive constitutional jurispru-
dence. According to Julius Goebel, the small size of the Philadelphia bar and the 
absence of reports meant that the practice was conducted "in a manner approxi-
mating the club-like atmosphere that prevailed contemporaneously in the English 
High Court of Admiralty."131 In short, the Court continued to operate in the early 
years in a manner not markedly different from the Privy Council. The absence of 
printed reports limited jurisprudential knowledge of the decisions largely to the 
Philadelphia bar.132 Volume 2 of Dallas's Reports (1798) included cases to 1793; 
volume 3 (1799) included cases through 1799. Volume 4, including Cooper v. 
Telfair and other cases from 1799 to 1800, however, did not appear until 1807, 
while William Cranch's competing volume of Supreme Court reports from 1801 
to 1803, including Marbury v. Madison, preceded it in 1804. The types of cases 
also left constitutional law somewhat underwhelming. The Court disposed of 
eighty-seven cases between 1789 and 1801. Thirty-five of these were admiralty 
cases; forty-two were various law cases (debt, assumpsit, ejectment, case, cove-
nant, and dower), nine equity cases, and one probate case to affirm a will.133 These 
cases raised issues arising under the Constitution: Chisolm v. Georgia was an 
assumpsit case; Ware v. Hylton was a debt case. Yet, repeatedly, the issues explored 
in these early cases remained jurisdictional rather than substantively constitu-
tional. Constitutional law would become jurisprudential-but not for some years. 
REVIEW OF LAW TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
American Constitutional law is the province of courts. Unlike the other two 
transformations, this aspect of constitutionalism was the product of 1787. In a 
book on control of colonial legislation, D. B. Swinfen defined review broadly as 
the process by which "colonial laws could either be ratified, amended, or rejected 
by the Crown or have their constitutional validity tested by the courts, colonial 
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and imperial."134 The functional loss of Privy Council review of legislation left 
control and constitutional validity of state legislation to courts alone. The rejec-
tion at the Philadelphia Convention of various models for negativing both state 
and congressional legislation left the Supreme Court the most plausible arbiter 
of constitutional issues. 
In the British Empire, review of legislation was ubiquitous. The Board of 
Trade (under the Privy Council) oversaw review in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries; the Colonial Office oversaw it in the nineteenth. Review was conducted 
usually pursuant to a requirement that colonial laws be not repugnant to the laws 
of England. During the nineteenth century, the Colonial Office reviewed thou-
sands of colonial laws, disallowing significantly fewer than 5 percent a year. Swin-
fen argues that the process was helpful in "pruning colonial laws" of "provisions 
which might be, probably inadvertently, repugnant," encouraged in "individual 
cases" some desirable uniformity of law, and could be used as an instrument of 
political control.135 For the sympathetic Swinfen, these fall into categories such 
as "imperial affairs," "humanitarianism" (under which Swinfen saw the Privy 
Council as a "champion" for "slaves, apprentices, immigrants, criminals, and ex-
convicts"), or protecting "vested interests." In 1865, this review became substan-
tively formalized under the Colonial Laws Validity Act, the "great legal landmark 
in colonial constitutional law."136 The act "clarified and narrowed" the under-
standing of repugnancy and left to "the colonial legislatures the responsibility for 
managing their own affairs.''137 
In the colonies, review was the significant form of imperial legislative control 
and an omnipresent aspect of colonial government. Privy Council instructions, 
governors' correspondence, and legislative sneakiness (suspension acts, etc.) re-
veal this reality. During the American .colonial period, 8,563 acts were reviewed. 
As a statistical piece, the number of disallowed laws was not large: 469, or 5.5 
percent.138 (This number is similar to the statistics during the later empire.) In 
comparison, the Supreme Court needs to review only a relatively small number 
of cases to have a significant influence. In the 2006 term, the Supreme Court 
heard oral arguments in 78 of the 8,857 cases filed and issued signed opinions in 
only 67.139 
Review of legislation conjures up a list of specific acts being sent to England. 
As practiced, review was far more comprehensive-at least with respect to trans-
mission of information. Between the late seventeenth century and the Revolution, 
the American colonies-with the noticeable exception of Rhode Island and Con-
necticut-sent the legislation and minutes of their legislative bodies. In 1909, 
Charles Andrews published a list "of the journals and acts of the councils and 
assemblies of the thirteen original colonies, and the Floridas, in America, pre-
served in the Public Record Office, London." The list was over one hundred pages 
long with twenty to forty collect.ions of laws on each page. Massachusetts, for 
example, sent their printed collections ·of the charter, acts, and laws (often in 
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duplicate); various manuscript acts; minutes of the council; and the journals of 
the assembly. Tens of thousands of pages of legislative records sailed to England. 
Unfortunately, despite review's overwhelming importance in the colonial pe-
riod, comparably little study has been given to the topic. Even to date, the only 
significant, admittedly outstanding, work remains Elmer Russell's Review of 
American Colonial Legislation by the King in Council of 1915. There is no com-
prehensive list of disallowed acts. Volumes 2 through 5 of Acts of the Privy Coun-
cil: Colonial Series contain appendices with acts confirmed or disallowed between 
1680 and the Revolution.140 Only a few contain titles, leaving the substance of 
many to the imagination. Although Russell's discussion suggested categories of 
the types of acts disallowed or confirmed, a general colonial historian has little 
way of easily learning whether the act being referred to remained in force, and 
there has been no verification of Russell's conclusions. Similarly, outside of a few 
specific instances, no one has sought to combine the extant law officer opinions 
and comments of the counsel to the Board of Trade and Plantations with the 
acts.141 Moreover, although Russell discussed general colonial evasion (for exam-
ple, failure to transmit laws, temporary laws, reenactment), no one has investi-
gated systematically the colonial response to disallowance of particular acts. 
This neglect is due largely to review's abandonment with the Convention. As 
has been often remarked on, the 1787 Constitution did not replace this practice. 
James Madison, and others at the Convention, wanted it to continue. In one of his 
many comments about the negativing power, he wrote, "This was the practice in 
Royal Colonies before the Revolution and would not have been inconvenient; if 
the supreme power for negativing had been faithful to the American interest, and 
had possessed the necessary information."142 After the Convention, Madison of-
fered an additional rationale: "A constitutional negative on the laws of the States 
seems equally necessary to secure individuals agst. encroachments on their 
rights."143 Yet for various and divergent reasons, the different negativing proposals 
eventually lost. The.executive veto alone survived. 
Near the end of the Convention, once the negative had been abandoned, two 
lawyers familiar with imperial practice added the "Constitution" to the grant of 
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and the clause respecting state legislation. Wil-
liam Samuel Johnson, author of the comments on the appeals briefs, and John 
Rutledge, who had studied in London at the Middle Temple, ensured that the 
Supreme Court at least would inherit some aspect of the review of colonial legisla-
tion.144 Connecticut's· Oliver Ellsworth then ensured that the First Judiciary Act 
would explicitly give jurisdiction over state legislation respecting the Constitution 
explicitly to the Supreme Court.145 
The transformation of colonial constitutionalism was largely the result of this 
loss of legislative review. Rhode Island and Connecticut alone had had charters 
that barred Privy Council review of legislation and permitted review only of judi-
cial appeals. The loss of legislative review placed the new Supreme Court-a court 
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comprised of judges, not judges and other members of the legislative and execu-
tive branches-with a jurisdiction peculiar to the colonial world. The Court-and 
the Court alone-became the arbiter of the Constitution. By the nineteenth cen-
tury, printed reports of the Court's decisions began to create a constitutional ju-
risprudence that turned away from "private law." The Constitution as an inter-
pretable public law document grew out of these other practices. 
Horwitz correctly saw a transformation in American private law between 1780 
and 1860. This transformation, however, did not occur against a stable or precon-
ceived notion of Constitutional law that sprang into being with the 1787 written 
Constitution. The transformation in American private law was dependent on an 
intertwined transformation of colonial constitutionalism to American Constitu-
tionalism. The transformation of American law between 1780 and 1860 was not 
only in private law but of the very notion of private and public law itself. Out of 
the great binary pairs of English law-lex scripta and lex non scripta, common 
law and statutory law-slowly grew another far more powerful legal construct, 
Constitutional law, with unconstitutional its sole opposing companion. 
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